

# Proof of Principle Simulation of a Handheld Dual Particle Imager

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Consortium for Verification Technology (CVT)



#### Introduction

#### **Motivation**

Human-portable systems are needed to locate special nuclear material (SNM) and identify warheads and for:

- Safeguards
- Treaty verification
- Emergency response

Nuclear weapons contain unique shapes of SNM that distinguish them from less dangerous items. SNM emits neutrons and gamma rays spontaneously or when interrogated.


A handheld dual particle imager (H<sup>2</sup>DPI) can exploit these two signatures to identify nuclear warheads.



#### **Scatter Camera Operation**


#### **Neutron Scatter Camera**

- Neutron elastically scatters twice in hydrogenous medium
- Velocity is determined from time and distance between scatters
- Energy of inter-scatter neutron determined from velocity and neutron mass
- Incident neutron energy determined through energy of scattered proton and energy conservation
- Scatter angle follows from conservation of energy and momentum
- Result: cone of possible incident directions



#### **Compton Scatter Camera**

- Photon Compton scatters twice in low-Z material
- Energy of inter-scatter photon is approximated by empirical function of energy deposited in second scatter
- Incident photon energy approximated by adding inter-scatter energy to energy deposited in first scatter
- Scatter angle determined from Compton equation, follows from conservation of energy and momentum
- Result: cone of possible incident directions



### Handheld Dual Particle Imager (H<sup>2</sup>DPI) Design

- Exploits recent advances in silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) technology to achieve compact form factor
- Utilizes the crystalline organic scintillator, stilbene, for sensitivity to, and discrimination between, neutrons and gamma rays
- Closely-packed multiple-pillar design enabled by previously measured stilbene/SiPM performance:
  - 0.5 cm position resolution along the length of 5 cm bar
  - Coincidence timing resolution less than 0.5 ns

Figure 3: (a) 2D and (b) 3D sketches of proposed H<sup>2</sup>DPI design.

a 3D Printed Dark Box


### **Previous Experimental Results**

- Measured position sensitivity within a bar of stilbene with a SiPM on either end
  - -0.6 cm x 0.6 cm x5.0 cm

Measured at 5 positions

- Collimated Na-22 source
- Position certainty of ± 0.5 cm

along bar



Pulse Height Ratio

Figure 4: (a) Setup and (b) results for position resolution experiment.

- Measured time resolution of stilbene/SiPM system
- Coincident annihilation photons Na-22 source • CAEN DT5730
- digitizer (500 MS/s) SensL C-Series SiPM
- SiPM standard output:  $0.28 \text{ ns } \sigma$
- SiPM fast output:  $0.23 \text{ ns } \sigma$ • Fast PMT: 0.32 ns σ

## Stilbene Cube SiPM Board Pulse Max F(Pulse Max) – – –

Figure 5: (a) Setup and (b) algorithm depiction for time resolution experiment

### Method

#### **Simulation Technique**

#### Particle **Transport**

- MCNPX-PoliMi Cf-252 spontaneous fission source
- Collect neutron and photon collisions in imager active volume

#### Detector Response

- Convert energy deposited to electron equivalent energy (linearly proportional to light output) Center X, Y position
  - above SiPM Gaussian broaden
  - (mean FWHM) • Light (7.7%)
  - Time (0.5 ns)

#### • Z position (1.2 cm)

#### Coincidence Pairing

- Match coincident pulses
- Require both pulses above threshold (40 keVee) into cone width Require interactions
- in different crystals Reject interactions in adjacent crystals for improved image quality

#### Cone Projections

- onto sphere Propagate uncertainties in measured quantities
- Back project cone Produce response matrix using cone projections as probability distribution functions
  - Observation matrix is a vector of ones

List Mode

MLEM

 Iterate, increasing likelihood of source image with each step

### Results

#### Simulation Setup

- Cf-252 placed 1m in front of system
- 4×10<sup>8</sup> fissions simulated
- Equivalent to 67 min of 10<sup>5</sup> fission/s source





Figure 6. Diagram of source location simulations.







Figure 7. Back projection image of (a) neutrons and (b) photons from Cf-252 source at 1 m.






Figure 8. MLEM image of (a) neutrons and (b) photons from Cf-252 source at 1 m.

### **Accurate Location Determination**




Figure 9. MLEM image of (a) neutrons and (b) photons from Cf-252 source at different angles at 1 m.

### Size Estimation using Neutron Imaging

- Simulated sphere sources of Cf-252
- Source 25 cm in front of system
- Varied source radius from 0 to 12 cm • Sources more than 4 cm in radius have >3σ larger FWHM
- than sources that are less than 3 cm in radius Significance: 1 IAEA significant quantity of plutonium is

equivalent to a metal sphere that is 4.6 cm in radius







Figure 10. MLEM image (FHM) as a function of source diameter.







estimation simulations.

Figure 12. MLEM image (FHM) of a Cf-252 (a) point source and (b) 10-cm radius sphere source.

### Conclusions

- Design allows accurate location determination using either neutrons or photons
- Imaging intrinsic efficiency for fission neutrons: 0.66%
- Neutron angular resolution: 10° FWHM
- Minimum distinguishable sphere radius using neutrons @ 25 cm: 4 cm

### Acknowledgement

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