Recent progress on physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads

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Nuclear warhead verification is both a political and technical challenge

- Global warhead stockpiles (primarily US and Russia) still total over 15 000.
- Future disarmament efforts will likely require *verification* of compliance.



The disarmament verification problem:


How can a warhead be reliably identified as authentic without revealing classified information?


MIT Physical Cryptographic Verification Protocol

Outline


- 1. The protocol
- 2. Summary of recent results
- 3. Experimental run at HVRL
- 4. Validation of G4NRF
- 5. Future work

Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is used to make isotopespecific measurements






The verification protocol avoids direct measurements of the warhead, protecting sensitive design information




Compare NRF signals: (Weapon A) x(Foil) vs (Weapon B) x(Foil)

Encryption by a physics process, not by software

We first proved the physical cryptographic concept using Geant4





Signal photons: $\vartheta \le \pi/4$ energy spectrum

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
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
Canonical hoax scenarios are detectable in tens of minutes




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
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We measured NRF spectra for U-238 and Al-27, and established additional diagnostics




The three major U-238 resonances (and branches) are clearly observed






The Al-27 line at 2.212 MeV is useful for normalization





Using a simplified model, we can predict the detected NRF count rate



The model gives good results for relative (normalized) measurements

theory:
$$\left(\frac{n_{2212}}{n_{2209}}\right)_{
m num} = 4.70.$$


experiment:
$$\left(\frac{n_{2212}}{n_{2209}} \right)_{
m exp} = 5.5 \pm 0.8$$

preliminary


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
Previous results from PNNL showed agreement to 20%




Preliminary results with a simple flux show closer to 5% agreement with no target...



...and similar results for thin targets...



...but thick target analytical models may need a notch refill correction



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
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Can we make absolute count rate predictions for an *experiment*, not just a simulation?



Can we quantify the sensitivity of the experiment?

- Cross section evaluations
- Temperature-dependence of cross sections
- Bremsstrahlung beam configurations
- Misalignments
- Small diversions of SNM
- More elaborate hoaxes

Physical cryptographic verification is a promising technique, but there are still technical challenges to resolve

Questions?

Backup: analytical model

$$\frac{d^3n}{dE\,d\Omega\,dx} = \phi_t(E)b\,\mu_{\rm NRF}(E)\frac{W(\theta)}{4\pi}\exp\left\{-x\left[\mu_{\rm NRF}(E) + \mu_{\rm nr}(E) + \frac{\mu_{\rm nr}(E')}{\cos\theta}\right]\right\}\epsilon_{\rm int}(E')P_f(E')$$

Backup: temperature-dependence

