

# *Fast Neutron Multiplicity Counter: Development of an active-mode counter*

*UM-INL Collaboration*

*T.H. Shin<sup>1</sup>, A. Di Fulvio<sup>1</sup>, D.L. Chichester<sup>2</sup>, S.D. Clarke<sup>1</sup>, S.A. Pozzi<sup>1</sup>*

*\* [thshin@umich.edu](mailto:thshin@umich.edu)*


*<sup>1</sup>Department of Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan Ann Arbor  
MI, U.S.A.*

*<sup>2</sup>Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls ID, U.S.A.*




# Introduction

- Need technological advances for the verification and monitoring of special nuclear material (SNM)
- Neutron multiplicity counting (NMC) used for non-destructive assay
- Traditional NMC systems utilize capture-based thermal neutron detectors
  - Typically a well-type geometry
  - Relies heavily on  $^3\text{He}$ -based detectors/systems
  - Increasing cost of  $^3\text{He}$  gas
- Investigate  $^3\text{He}$  alternatives






$^3\text{He}$  tubes with moderator




Design schematic of a typical multiplicity counter<sup>1</sup>


# UM-INL Collaboration: Organic Scintillators



# UM-INL Collaboration: Fast Neutron Multiplicity Counters




Design concepts in MCNPX-PoliMi  
(2012)




INL (2012)  
Passive measurements: 4 EJ-309  
(2012)



ISPRA, Italy (2013)  
Passive measurements: 16 EJ-309  
(2013)







INL (2015)  
Passive measurements: 8 EJ-309 and 8 Stilbene (2015)



INL (2016)  
Active measurements: 8 EJ-309 and 8 Stilbene (2016)


# Advantages of Fast Neutron Multiplicity Counters

- 1) Much faster timing properties relative to thermal systems  
→ improved timing resolution
- 2) No moderating material required  
→ short die-away times
- 3) Portion of initial neutron energy information retained  
→ spectrum unfolding capabilities
- 4) Low rate of accidental correlated counts  
→ lower uncertainty






# UM-INL Collaboration: Passive Measurements (2015)







FNMC System at INL 2015



Number of Plates	3	5	7	9	13	15
Actual Mass [g]	75.15	125.25	175.35	225.45	325.65	375.75
Estimated Mass [g]	75.80 ± 0.18	126.03 ± 0.13	177.74 ± 0.20	225.75 ± 0.21	327.20 ± 0.17	374.39 ± 0.18
Percent Difference	-0.87 %	-0.62%	-1.36%	-0.13%	-0.48%	0.36%

# From Passive to Active-Mode: System Design

- Interrogative source: AmLi
  - Two AmLi neutron sources ( $\sim 50,000$  n/s)
- New components/features for active FNMC system
  - 1) Polyethylene moderator/reflector for AmLi sources
  - 2) Compact electronics
  - 3) 3-D printed Stilbene detector casing
  - 4) New detector holder structure
  - 5) Special acquisition techniques (on-board photon rejection)



# Experimental Campaign UM-INL 2016

## Objectives:

1. Measure multiplicity counts from induced fissions in Uranium samples of various mass content / enrichment
2. Produce mass calibration curve for fissile mass estimation
3. Investigate FNMC system sensitivity to diversion scenarios


Three sets of measurements: CRM-146, **CRM-149**, and **uranium pins**






# Experimental Campaign UM-INL 2016

- CRM 149 and CRM 146 details ( $U_3O_8$ )




CRM-149 (For all)	$^{234}U$	$^{235}U$	$^{236}U$	$^{238}U$
Iso. Comp. (wt%)	1.018	<u>93.257</u>	0.395	5.329




CRM-146 Iso. Comp. (wt%)	$^{234}U$	$^{235}U$	$^{236}U$	$^{238}U$
CRM146-69	0.148	<u>20.107</u>	0.197	79.547
CRM146-70	0.375	<u>52.800</u>	0.264	46.560
CRM146-71	0.980	<u>93.170</u>	0.293	5.555

# Experimental Campaign UM-INL 2016


- **Uranium pins** (75.52 g per pin, enrichment = 16.37%,  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$ )




32 pins  
Mass = 2416.64 g




31 pins  
Mass = 2341.12 g




30 pins  
Mass = 2265.60 g




28 pins  
Mass = 2114.56 g



24 pins  
Mass = 1812.48 g



20 pins  
Mass = 1510.4 g




16 pins  
Mass = 1208.32 g



# Results: CRM-149

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)




CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
$^{235}\text{U}$ Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3

# Results: Mass Estimation

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)

Proof of concept:



CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
<sup>235</sup> U Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3






# Results: Mass Estimation

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)

Proof of concept:

- 1) Take subset of data as calibration samples




CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
$^{235}\text{U}$ Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3

# Results: Mass Estimation

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)

Proof of concept:

- 1) Take subset of data as calibration samples
- 2) Fit calibration curve (second-order polynomial)




CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
$^{235}\text{U}$ Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3

# Results: Mass Estimation

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)

Proof of concept:

- 1) Take subset of data as calibration samples
- 2) Fit calibration curve (second-order polynomial)
- 3) Take remainder of data as assay samples




CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
$^{235}\text{U}$ Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3

# Results: Mass Estimation

- 10 min measurement
- 60 keVee applied threshold ( $\approx 0.5$  MeV neutron energy)

Proof of concept:

- 1) Take subset of data as calibration samples
- 2) Fit calibration curve (second-order polynomial)
- 3) Take remainder of data as assay samples
- 4) Estimate mass of assay samples with calibration curve




CRM-149	67	68	70
Actual Mass [g]	806.5	1244.7	2203.6
Estimated Mass [g]	786.19 $\pm$ 3.96	1179.4 $\pm$ 4.64	2358.1 $\pm$ 6.49
Percent Difference	-2.58 %	-5.54%	6.43%

CRM-149	66	67	68	69	70	71
$^{235}\text{U}$ Mass [g]	393.1	786.2	1179.4	1572.2	2358.1	3144.3




# Results: Pin Diversion Sensitivity

- What is the sensitivity of the FNMC system to detect a diversion scenario with  $> 95\%$  confidence for a fixed measurement time?
  - How many pins must be removed such that the relative difference in  $D > 2\sigma_D$  of full assembly?
  - How does sensitivity change for various measurement times?




Pins / Removed pins	<sup>235</sup> U Mass [g]	D [cps]	$\sigma_D$
32 / 0	2416.64	15.42	0.214
31 / 1	2341.12	15.56	0.218
30 / 2	2265.60	15.25	0.214
28 / 4	2114.56	14.72	0.211
24 / 8	1812.48	14.70	0.210
20 / 12	1510.40	12.33	0.192
16 / 16	1208.32	7.55	0.154

# Results: Pin Diversion Sensitivity




For a 1 minute measurement time, FNMC system can detect a 12 pin diversion scenario (approx. 900 g removal) with > 95% confidence

# Results: Pin Diversion Sensitivity



For a 3 minute measurement time, FNMC system can detect a 8 pin diversion scenario (approx. 600 g removal) with > 95% confidence

# Results: Pin Diversion Sensitivity



For a 5 minute measurement time, FNMC system can detect a 4 pin diversion scenario (approx. 300 g removal) with > 95% confidence



# Conclusions

- Successfully measured neutron multiplets from induced fissions in active-mode (AmLi)
  - $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  samples of various mass content and enrichment levels
  - Uranium pin assemblies of various configurations
- Produced mass calibration curve and estimated fissile mass within  $\pm 7\%$  of actual mass for a 10 min measurement time
- Investigated FNMC system sensitivity of pin diversion scenarios
  - Sensitive to 4 diverted pins with  $> 95\%$  confidence in 5 mins



# Acknowledgment



The authors thank D.L. Chichester (INL) for their collaboration to this research.

This work was funded in-part by the Consortium for Verification Technology under Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration award number DE-NA0002534.



# Thank you for your time!



Special thanks to C. Sosa and S. Watson for their help during the experiment!  
Demonstration: Michigan Room



# *Fast Neutron Multiplicity Counter: Development of an active-mode counter*

*UM-INL Collaboration*

*T.H. Shin<sup>1</sup>, A. Di Fulvio<sup>1</sup>, D.L. Chichester<sup>2</sup>, S.D. Clarke<sup>1</sup>, S.A. Pozzi<sup>1</sup>*

*\* [thshin@umich.edu](mailto:thshin@umich.edu)*

*<sup>1</sup>Department of Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan Ann Arbor  
MI, U.S.A.*

*<sup>2</sup>Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls ID, U.S.A.*



# References

- 1) N.Ensslin, W.C. Harker, M.S. Krick, D.G. Langner, M.M. Pickrell, J.E. Stewart, Application guide to neutron multiplicity counting, LA-13422-M, Los Alamos National Laboratory (1998)
- 2) T.H. Shin, A. Di Fulvio, T. Jordan, D.L. Chichester, S.D. Clarke, S.A. Pozzi. “Fast Neutron Multiplicity Counter based on Stilbene and EJ-309 Scintillators for Nuclear Non-Destructive Assay” INMM 57<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Atlanta GA. (2016)
- 3) D.L. Chichester, S.A. Pozzi, J.L. Dolan, M.T. Kinlaw, A.C. Kaplan, M. Flaska, A. Enqvist, J.T. Johnson, S.M. Watson, MPACT Fast Neutron Multiplicity System Design Concepts, INL/EXT-12-27619, Idaho National Laboratory (2012)
- 4) J.L. Dolan, M. Flaska, A. Poitrasson-Riviere, A. Enqvist, P. Peerani, D.L. Chichester, S.A. Pozzi. “Plutonium measurements with a fast-neutron multiplicity counter for nuclear safeguards applications” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A, Vol 763, pgs. 565-574 (2014)
- 5) W. Hage, D.M. Cifarelli. “Models for a three-parameter analysis of neutron signal correlation measurements for fissile material assay” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Phys. Research A, Vol 251, pgs. 550-563 (1986)







# *Extra Slides*





# System Characterization



## 1) Gain matching





## 2) PSD performance



## 3) Gamma rejection



## 4) Timing properties





# Counting Method

- Feynman counting method (constant window, random triggers)
  - Gate width = 200 ns
  - Gives number of single detections ( $n=1$ ), two-event coincidences ( $n=2$ ), and three-event coincidences ( $n=3$ ) within gate width  $\rightarrow \text{Det}(n)$
  - First- (S), second- (D), and third-order (T) factorial moments from combinatorial expansion of  $\text{Det}(1)$ ,  $\text{Det}(2)$ , and  $\text{Det}(3)$ .

$$S = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n \text{Det}(n)$$

$$D = \sum_{n=2}^{\infty} n(n-1) \text{Det}(n)$$

$$T = \sum_{n=3}^{\infty} n(n-1)(n-2) \text{Det}(n)$$

\* $\text{Det}(n) = B_x^+(\tau)$  and S, D, and T are  $m_{b(\mu=1)}$ ,  $m_{b(\mu=2)}$ ,  $m_{b(\mu=3)}$ , respectively according to Hages-Cifarelli notations

$$m_{b(\mu)} = \sum_{x=\mu}^{\infty} \binom{x}{\mu} B_x^+(\tau), [5]$$

# Doubles vs. Energy Threshold

- Neutron cross-talk decreases as energy threshold increases
- Comparison of D for various energy threshold (marginal differences in shape)
- Higher energy threshold = more sensitive to changes in D

