**International Safeguards & Acquisition Path Analysis**

- A State level safeguards approach considers a State as a whole and not just a collection of individual facilities.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is focused on maximizing its efficiency and confidence in safeguards implementation.
- This is done by assessing “plausible paths by which... nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could be acquired” [1], known as Acquisition Path Analysis (APA).

In order to conduct an APA for a given State, information must be known about the • declared fuel cycle infrastructure, • inventory of source material • inventory nuclear material

This information can be combined with potential undeclared facilities and imported material to determine all possible material pathways.

**Fuel Cycle Simulators**

Nuclear fuel cycle simulators (FCS) are tools designed to track the material balance throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. However, these same codes have the potential to inform international safeguards by providing in depth modeling and evaluation of the material throughput and accountancy of a particular fuel cycle.

A variety of tools have been developed by national labs, academia, and even the IAEA itself to perform fuel cycle analyses. • Discrete (individual facilities) or fleet-level modeling • Economics tools • Dynamic/transient scenarios

**Throughput and Material Accountancy**

Tracking the throughput of a facility could inform the probability of material diversion detection. For example a high-throughput facility has more material with the potential to be diverted than a lower throughput facility. This is shown visually as a State with a simple fuel cycle in Figure 3.

- An identical inspection schedule might detect diversion at the low throughput facilities before a Significant Quantity of material is diverted but is unable to do the same at the higher throughput facility.
- Ideally, this throughput consideration would be used to inform the probability of detection for a given safeguards measure.

**Protracted Diversion**

One potential pathway to diverting a Significant Quantity of nuclear material is collecting small amounts of material from many facilities. This hypothetical poses detection challenges since the material unaccounted for at any given facility could be within uncertainties in the material accountancy. In Figure 4, a small amount of material is diverted from several facilities but ultimately a large quantity of material is diverted.

Not only could a fuel cycle simulator model this protracted diversion scenario, but the uncertainty associated with each material mass could be tracked as well.

**Individual Path Throughput**

Some fuel cycle simulators store the full path for every discrete quantity of material, including when materials are split or combined. This feature could be used to determine the theoretical maximum throughput of an acquisition path. For example, imagine a contrived quantity of mixed oxide fuel with isotopics shown in Figure 6. Material in the fuel has followed five distinct paths (from three fuel cycles).

Material pathways can be visualized in several ways, • A linear model which shows each individual path (Figure 7) • A single fuel cycle with all paths overlaid (Figure 8)

**Future Work**

- Implement throughput visualization into fuel cycle simulations
- Couple an APA tool with a fuel cycle simulator to conduct a detailed analysis on the most likely diversion pathways
- Identify techniques to map statistical uncertainties to throughput
- Determine ways to integrate instrumentation and true data into fuel cycle simulators

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